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Abstract
This paper models corporatism as aﬀecting both the preferences of the parties
involved as well as the rules of the game. The analysis is conducted in a union-
government game on determining wages and unemployment beneﬁts. The result
indicates that international conditions might be important for the functions of the
concept of corporatism. It may also serve as an explanation to the poor perfor-
mance on production and employment in some of the former so successful European
corporatist states in the 1990s. The implication of this is that corporatism might
not be a successful social organisation in the globalised economy.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The need for the trade unions and the industry to take responsibility in governing the
economy has been put on the forefront of the agenda by politicians in a number of
European states lately. An example is the establishment of a social pact between the
government, the trade union confederation, and the central private employer’s confed-
eration in Italy, in December 1998. In Sweden negotiations between the trade union
confederation and the central employer’s confederation on forming an alliance for growth
have been encouraged by the government, which also appointed former prime minister
Ingvar Carlsson as mediator, in March 1999 (Svenska Dagbladet, 1999). It seems like
these actions seek to restore the concept of corporatism as means to govern the domestic
economy, and to be able to cope with changes in the international economic environment.
The picture on economic performance in the small European states from the 1950 is
however not clear, as pointed out in Burda (1997). These states where corporatist struc-
tures have been pointed out as an eﬀective social organisation, by both political scientists
e.g. Katzenstein (1985) and economists e.g. Calmfors and Driﬃll (1988) performed rel-
atively well up to the mid 1980s. However, since then the small European states have
shown diﬀerent patterns, especially in the 1990s. Examples are Finland and Sweden show-
ing that the corporatist system is not immune against persistent and high unemployment
rates, while other corporatist states as Austria and Norway have continued to perform
relatively well and experienced low unemployment rates. The present model, which is an
extension of the Burda (1997) model of corporatist and non-corporatist behaviour, shows
that corporatism could be a successful social organisation in a stable economic environ-
ment, but in a volatile economic environment this need not be the case. The study thus
indicates an explanation to why these diﬀerences may appear.
1.1 The Concept of Corporatism
The concept of corporatism has several deﬁnitions in the political science literature,
e.g. Schmitter (1974), Wilensky (1976), Schmidt (1982), Lehmbruch (1984), and Lewin
(1994). In a, by political scientists, frequently quoted study Katzenstein (1985) argued
that the small European states with corporatist features were more successful and ﬂex-
ible to international changes than states with weak corporatist structures. Katzenstein
(1985) deﬁnes corporatism as a form of social partnership between the government and
centralised interest groups, as actors, who voluntarily and informally coordinate conﬂict-
ing objectives. It is also argued that during periods when the domestic economy is under
2the pressure of some exogenous shock the voluntary coordination is most frequent. The
above stated deﬁnition is, as argued in Hansson (1990), consistent with Olson’s (1982)
theories on encompassing organisations. Olson (1982) argued that ”encompassing organi-
zations have some incentive to make the society in which they operate more prosperous,
and an incentive to redistribute income to their members with as little excess burden as
possible, and to cease such redistribution unless the amount redistributed is substantial
to the social cost of the redistribution.”
In economics formal models describing the economic impact of corporatism are rare,
as noted by for instance Bruno and Sachs (1985), Booth (1995) and Burda (1997). Most
studies have focused on how wage structures on the macroeconomic level are aﬀected
by various degrees of centralisation in wage bargaining, e.g. Calmfors and Horn (1986),
Tarantelli (1986), Calmfors and Driﬃll (1988), Layard (1991), Mulder (1993), and Booth
(1995). These studies have tended to deﬁne corporatism as centralised wage bargaining.
In a frequently cited study, Calmfors and Driﬃll (1988) hypothesise a hump shaped
relationship between the degree of corporatism and the real wage.
In an empirical oriented study, Pekkarinen et al. (1992) analyses the impact of cor-
poratism on various areas in the economy. Corporatism in their study is characterised
by two basic features. First, the centralised wage bargaining. Second, the non-exclusive
and egalitarian nature, i.e. the non-exclusion of any social group from the labour market,
and sharing both the beneﬁts of increasing economic welfare and the miseries of recession
and the burden of adjustment. This deﬁnition is closer to the one used earlier in political
science.
Burda (1997) deﬁnes corporatism as ”measures which improve upon noncooperative
interactions between union and government”. This deﬁnition is closer to the one used
by Katzenstein (1985) and Pekkarinen et al. (1992) than deﬁnitions used in earlier eco-
nomic theoretical studies. Burda’s (1997) analysis is conducted within a game theoretical
framework, where a monopoly union formulates its’ wage demands regarding the unem-
ployment beneﬁt level as given. In a self-ﬁnancing system any additional unemployment
will have negative budgetary implications and requires an increase in labour taxation
and labour costs. Furthermore, the government determines the unemployment beneﬁt
level to maximise some social objective function given the level of wages, its actions will
inﬂuence the process of wage formation. Burda (1997) argues that this interdependence
implies that the Cournot/Nash equilibrium can be improved upon, i.e. in the corporatist
economy the solution is cooperative. The basic results are that yet welfare improving for
the parties involved the eﬀects on wages and unemployment beneﬁt levels are ambiguous.
31.2 Modelling Corporatism
The present study shows that, focusing on arguments in political science on the func-
tions of corporatism, a model of the type speciﬁed by Burda (1997) yields results that
can be interpreted that corporatism is a successful social organisation in a stable eco-
nomic environment, yielding lower wage rates and hence a higher level of production.
On the other hand, when the economic environment is more volatile and the domestic
economy is in stress and/or under the extent of exogenous economic shocks the results
are ambiguous. These results emanates from the fact that, as argued by e.g. Lehm-
bruch (1982) and Katzenstein (1985), cooperation in the corporatist economy is a form
of crisis management. Hence, the agents do not cooperate all the time in the corporatist
economy, which they are assumed to do in the Burda (1997) model, but only when the
economy is in stress. For example Lehmbruch (1982) argues that ”corporatist incomes
policies have mostly been a sort of crisis management where, under economic stress,t h e
organisations have been ready to cooperate” (my italics). The rationale for this could be
pure political. Towards the union members the leaders of the union wants to be able
to show independence from the government, otherwise they risk to be connected with
impopular political decisions. In the same manner to keep its credibility the govern-
ment must be careful not to be too much connected with a single interest group such
as a monopoly trade union. Furthermore, focusing on Katzenstein’s (1985) deﬁnition
of corporatism where social partnership is a central feature, it seems reasonable to ar-
gue that because of deliberative processes the corporatist union takes a broader social
interest than a non-corporatist union. Thus, to stylise this the Burda (1997) model is
extended in two ways, both in the objectives and in the rules of the game. First,t h e
corporatist and non-corporatist trade unions have diﬀerent objective functions. Besides
the motivation above, a possible explanation for this is that the government allows the
corporatist union to take part in political decisions if they act with social responsibility;
here modelled as incorporating the interests of capital owners into the unions’ decisions.
This inclusion could also be seen to be in accordance with Olson’s (1982) theories on
encompassing organisations. According to Olson these organisations are so broad that
they have diﬃculties in separating the social interest from the own group’s interest. Thus
the objective function of the corporatist union is similar, and in an extreme case identi-
cal, to the government’s objective function. Second, by assumption cooperation between
the government and the trade union only occurs in the corporatist economy, and only
when the economy is in stress or exposed to exogenous shocks. This is as stated above in
4accordance with the arguments by e.g. Lehmbruch (1982) and Katzenstein (1985) that
the coordination between the parties is intensiﬁed when the economy is in stress or under
the extent of some exogenous shock.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the economic environment
and the agents of the model. Section 3 describes and discusses possible strategies for
the union and the government. In section 4 diﬀerent equilibria are analysed and dis-
cussed. The main results of the model are that a corporatist economy, compared with a
non-corporatist economy has persistently lower wages in a stable economic environment,
ceteris paribus. Furthermore, cooperation between the government and the trade union
leads to ambiguous changes in wages and unemployment beneﬁts, implying ambiguous
results in employment and hence in the level of aggregated production, thus indicating
that the corporatist economy might not be a successful concept in a volatile economic
environment. Finally, section 5 concludes the study, and relates the results to earlier
literature and to empirical observations in the time period from the 1950s.
2 Economic and Political Structure
Consider an economy with three types of agents, the monopoly union, the ﬁrms, and the
government. The union decides the net wage level, w, and the government chooses the
unemployment beneﬁtl e v e l ,b. The level of taxation, τ, is endogenously determined to
balance the governmental budget. Given the gross wage the ﬁrm then choose how much
labour to employ, n, in this model expressed as a fraction of the labour force which is
normalized to unity.
This behaviour can be seen as a game between two players, the union and the gov-
ernment, with full information on the game choosing the net wage level, w,a n dt h e
unemployment beneﬁt level, b, respectively under the restriction that the government
balances its’ budget.
2.1 The Firm
The representative ﬁrm maximises its proﬁts π, subject to a given world market price
level, p, normalised to unity, and the gross wage rate, w(1 + τ),w h e r eτ is the tax rate
endogenously determined by the government budget constraint.
π = f(n) − w(1 + τ)n (1)
5where
y = f(n) f
0 > 0,f
00 < 0 (2)
y is the aggregated output of the ﬁrm and f(n) the aggregated production function,
showing diminishing returns in the production input labour, n. Other production inputs
such as capital are not explicitly shown in the model since they by assumption are held
constant. The maximum level of production in the economy is reached when the economy
is in the state of full employment. The ﬁrm’s wage costs are linear in labour input and
gross wages.
Proﬁt maximisation implies convex labour demand for the ﬁrm in gross wages, w(1+τ)
n = g(w(1 + τ)), (3)
where g0 < 0,s i n c ef(n) is concave.
2.2 The Trade Union
The monopoly union represents a fraction λ of the economy’s employed labour force.
The union is assumed to decide the real net wage, w,a n dt h eﬁrm employs a fraction
n of the economy’s labour force, according to the labour demand function speciﬁed in




given government behaviour. An approach to represent union
preferences in utilitarian objective functions are known from e.g. McDonald and Solow
(1982), Oswald (1982, and 1985), and Burda (1997). However, in our model we work with
an extension of the utilitarian objective function where the level of aggregated production
is included. This function can be seen to represent the preferences of the union leaders.
They are assumed to seek to stay in power of the union, which requires a suﬃciently high
level of utility for the members. Furthermore, they seek to maximise union power, which
requires a suﬃciently high member rate, and hence a low degree of unemployment. The
objective function is speciﬁed as:
Ω
U = λnu(w)+α(n − λn)u(w)+β(1 − n)u(b)+γy (4)
where u(w) represents utility levels for employed members and non-members and u(b)
represents the utility of the unemployed. Assume u0 > 0 and u00 < 0. The parameters
α,β ∈ (0,1] are relative utility weights assigned by the union to non-member employed
and unemployed, respectively. Parameter γ > 0 is the relative weight assigned the level
of aggregated production in the economy, f(n). The corporatist union assigns the level of
6production positive weight, i.e. γ > 0. The non-corporatist union sets γ =0 . It should
be noted that when γ =0and the union member rate is exogenously given, the objective
function is identical to the one speciﬁed in Burda (1997).
The inclusion of the level of production, i.e. γ > 0, in the objective function could
be motivated by the assumption that the government gives the corporatist union the
opportunity to take part in governing the economy only if they take a broad social interest.
The inclusion is also in accordance with the theories by Olson (1982) on encompassing
organisations. The encompassing organisation represents an interest group of a size large
enough making it diﬃcult to separate the interests of the own group from the public
interest. It can also be seen as an eﬀect of deliberative processes. Frequent contacts
between the government and the trade union makes them more aware of each other’s
problems.
2.3 The Government
The government seeks to stay in power. In order to do so it is assumed to balance the
utility of diﬀerent interest groups and the level of aggregated production. The objective
function of the government to be maximised is
Ω
G = nu(w)+( 1− n)u(b)+δy. (5)
The government weights the utilities of employed and unemployed equally. The govern-
ment also assigns a weight δ > 0 on aggregated output in the economy. If δ = γ,w h i c h
can be the case when close contacts exists between the government and the corporatist
union, and α = β =1the government and the corporatist union have identical objective
functions. If δ =0 ,a n dα = β =1the government and the non-corporatist union have
identical objective functions.
The government chooses the level of unemployment beneﬁts in order to maximise ΩG
taking w as given and with respect to the demand function for labour, equation (3), and
a budget constraint implying that the sum of unemployment beneﬁts must be ﬁnanced
with taxes.
τwn =( 1− n)b (6)
A binding budget constraint implies that the government can not choose both τ and b;
consequently τ =( b/w)(n−1 −1). The existence of an equilibrium tax rate is determined
by the labour demand function. Assuming that non-trivial solutions exist, of which the
minimum tax rate is chosen, we analyse what conditions must be fulﬁlled in equilibrium.
7The labour demand function (3) has the following properties n ∈ (0,1), ∂n
∂τ = wg0 < 0,
and ∂2n
∂τ2 = w2g00 > 0, i.e. convex in τ. To avoid trivial solutions, assume that g(w,0) ≤ 1,
i.e. unemployment exists when the labour taxation is zero. Furthermore, the inverse
of the government budget constraint implies that, in equilibrium, labour demand must
satisfy








h(·)=0 . Contemplating g (τ,w) and h(τ,w,b) in (n,τ)
space, at the equilibrium tax rate the demand for labour must equal the inverse budget
constraint i.e. g (τ,w)=h(τ,w,b). Furthermore, at the minimum equilibrium tax
rate the labour demand function crosses the inverse budget constraint from below, i.e.
∂g
∂τ > ∂h









Which in equilibrium can be rewritten as
−bg
0g
−2 < 1. (9)
Consequently, a necessary condition at the minimum equilibrium tax rate is that
−bg
0g






This implies that for all production functions f, that imply labour demand functions g
that fulﬁlls condition (10), at least one equilibrium tax rate exists. Clearly the production
function sets the range of possible wage rates, w, and unemployment beneﬁt levels, b,
that generates equilibrium. The unemployment beneﬁt level is limited upwards, b<−
g2
g0 .
Furthermore, under the existence of an equilibrium tax rate, equation (3) yields n =
g(w + b(n−1 − 1)), i.e. labour demand can be expressed as a function of net wages,
w, and unemployment beneﬁts, b. Both the government and the union are assumed to
recognise the ﬁnancial implications of an increase in unemployment beneﬁts, b, on labour
taxes, τ.B o t h a g r e a t e r ﬁscal burden of the existing unemployment stock and higher
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0) < 0. (11)










0 < 0. (12)
8Since the tax rate is endogenous in the model and we are interested in the actions taken by
the union and the government who are regarded as completely informed, the elasticity of
labour demand with respect to net wages, for a given b and given the ﬁnancial constraint







which, following Burda (1997), for convenience is assumed to be constant.
3S t r a t e g i e s 1
3.1 The Trade Union’s Reaction Function
The optimal policy of a monopolist union taking the unemployment beneﬁt level as given
has been described by e.g. Oswald (1982, and 1985), and Burda (1997). The ﬁrst order
condition of the maximisation problem is:
∂ΩU
∂w





0 [(1 − α)λn + αn]=0 (14)
where, in order to shorten the expressions, u is denoting utility of wages, i.e. u =( w),
and e u is utility from unemployment beneﬁts, i.e. e u = u(b). Using equation (13) the ﬁrst
order condition can be rewritten as:
wu
0 [(1 − α)λ + α] − η [(1 − α)λu + αu − βe u + γf
0]=0 (15)
⇔
[(1 − α)λ + α]
u0w
((1 − α)λu + αu − βe u + γf0)
= η (16)
implying that the union sets the wage so that the elasticity of a utility gain in employment
from an increase in the net wage is equal to the elasticity of labour demand. When γ =0 ,
and the member rate in the union is exogenously given this condition is identical to the
result derived in the Burda (1997) model. Furthermore if γ =0and α = β =1 ,t h e
condition is analogous to the results derived by McDonald and Solow (1981), Oswald
(1982), and Booth (1985).
The net wage, w, set by the union depends on the unemployment beneﬁtl e v e l ,b, i.e.
the union strategy is a function of the unemployment beneﬁt level set by the government,
1An appendix with further mathematics is avilable upon request from the author.
9w = w(b). In order to analyse the strategy, note that the evolution of union utility in b,
is ambiguous, since the sign of ∂ΩU/∂b = −[(1 − α)λ + α](1−n)u0+β(1−n)e u0 depends
on the size of parameters α, β, λ, and the marginal utilities. This implies diﬀerent
possibilities for the form of the preferences. They may be ever increasing or decreasing
in b, or both. Where the latter implies bliss point preferences.
Furthermore, following Oswald (1982), and Burda (1997), the slope of the reaction




∂w2 . If the second order condition
∂2ΩU
∂w2 = u
























βe u0 − γf00∂n
∂b
¢
which is positive or
negative depending on the size of the weight γ put on the level of aggregated production,
i.e. the slope of the reaction function is of ambiguous sign. Note that if γ =0 , implying
a non-corporatist union, the reaction function is unambiguously positively sloped. A
suﬃcient condition for the second order condition (17) to be fulﬁlled is that the coeﬃcient
of relative risk aversion exceeds 1,t h a ti s−u00w
u0 > 1. It is possible to graphically represent





Figure 1: Union preferences and possible reaction function.
there are several possibilities to graphically represent combinations of preferences and
the reaction functions of diﬀerent slope. However, as will be seen later the slope of the
union’s reaction function has no implications for the results of the model. This is also
the case for the bliss point preferences.
10Comparing strategies for the corporatist and the non-corporatist unions there will
obviously be a diﬀerence in the chosen strategy. The corporatist union will always,
ceteris paribus, respond with a lower wage rate, w, to a given unemployment beneﬁt
level, b, than the non-corporatist union. The reason is that the objective function of







∂w < 0. Hence, the reaction function of the corporatist union
is pushed down to the right in (w,b) space. The reaction functions representing the





Figure 2: Reaction functions for corporatist respective non-corporatist unions.
3.2 The Government’s Reaction Function
The government maximises the objective function (5) under the budget restriction (6).
The ﬁrst order condition gives
∂ΩG
∂b




+( 1− n)e u
0 =0 (18)
Use the fact that equations (11) and (12) implies that ∂n







−1 − 1). (19)
This allows us to rewrite the ﬁrst order condition (18) using equation (19) and the deﬁ-
nition of the elasticity of labour demand (13) as
∂ΩG
∂b
= −η [u − e u + δf
0]+we u
0 =0 . (20)
11The unemployment beneﬁt level, b, set by the government depends on the net wage
rate, w, decided by the union, i.e. government strategy can be represented in a reaction
function of the form b = b(w).
In order to further analyse the government strategy, ﬁrst note that the sign of ∂ΩG/∂w =
nu0+[u − e u + δf0](∂n/∂w)=n(u0 − ˜ u0) is depending on which marginal utility that dom-
inates along the reaction function. Thus, the evolution of government utility in w is of
ambiguous sign. Furthermore, the implicit function theorem states that the slope of the
government’s reaction function is given by db
dw = −∂2ΩG
∂b∂w/∂2ΩG
∂b2 . U s i n gt h es a m el o g i ca s
for the union, if the second order condition is fulﬁlled, which requires e u00w
e u0 > η, then the
sign of db










∂w < 0, which is deﬁned in equation (12). The sign of equation (21) is ambiguous,
depending on the weight, δ, put on the level of production, f(n) and on the relative levels
of marginal utilities, u0 and ˜ u0.
The above stated implies that in some unrestricted sense the government exhibits bliss
point preferences. The argument for bliss point preferences is increased if as in Burda
(1997) it is assumed that u and ˜ u represents diﬀerent utility functions where ˜ u0 >u 0.
Furthermore, this certiﬁes that the bliss point is in the feasible range of the strategy set
if the government imposes the restriction b ≤ w, i.e. the unemployment beneﬁtl e v e l
can never exceed the wage rate. The bliss point preferences for the government arises
since it might exist a trade oﬀ between two wage rates that results in the same value on
the objective function at a constant unemployment beneﬁt level. These preferences imply
either positively or negatively sloped reaction functions depending on the relative weights
in the government objective function. In Figure 3 some possible indiﬀerence maps, with
implied reaction functions have been depicted. Later, in the analysis of diﬀerent possible
equilibria we focus on two diﬀerent cases one where higher and one where lower wage
rates are preferred by the government.
4 Equilibria
The monopoly union and the government are now regarded as two players in a game. The
strategy set for the union is the set of diﬀerent wages it can choose. The government’s
set of strategies is the set of possible unemployment rates it can choose. The payoﬀ for








Figure 3: Government preferences and implied reaction functions.
The preferences of the union and the government yield a number of possible equilibria
depending on the characteristics of the player’s preferences. We will analyse two types
of equilibria emanating from whether the government prefer increasing (Figure 4 a) or
decreasing (Figure 4 b) wage rates. This because these two cases yields contradictory
results on unemployment and production. Figure 4 describing a non-corporatist economy
shows preference maps (Ω) and reaction functions (w(b) and b(w)) for the government
(G) and the non-corporatist union (U) respectively. For simplicity the reaction functions
are drawn as straight lines, but may as shown before be nonlinear.
The intersection of the reaction functions represents the Nash-Cournot equilibrium (A)
with (wA and bA). The Stackelberg solution is determined by a player selecting the value
of the decision variable which maximises his objectives against the opponent’s reaction
function. The Stackelberg solution with the government as leader is denoted (SG) with
(wSG and bSG) and with the union as leader (SU) with (wSU and bSU). As can be seen in
Figure 4 the diﬀerences between the Stackelberg solution and the Nash-Cournot solution
depends both on the characteristics of the preferences and on who is the leader. If the
government is acting as the leader in Figure 4 a) it implies what Burda (1997) calls a
”rigorous” policy, inferior to the union. While Figure 4 b) shows the possibility of a
policy which is welfare improving for both parties. The results so far are identical with

























Figure 4: Nash-Cournot equilibrium (A) and Stackelberg equilibria (SG and SU) with
diﬀerent preference maps for the government (G) and the union (U).
simultanous and that a Stackelberg game implies diﬀerent solutions than a simultaneous
game with the Nash-Cournot solution this has no implication for our results. Hence, in
t h ef o l l o w i n gw ea s s u m et h eg a m et ob es i m u l t a n e o u s .
Now turn to the corporatist economy. Here, as argued above, the diﬀerence between
the corporatist and non-corporatist unions are shown in the preference sets. The cor-
poratist union has a diﬀerent objective function compared to the non-corporatist union,
where the former type of union takes a broader social interest than the later. This has, as
shown earlier, an eﬀect on the strategy set of the corporatist union. Ceteris paribus the
optimum wage rate for the corporatist union is lower than for the non-corporatist union.
This results in a lower Nash-Cournot equilibrium (B) for in the corporatist economy, as
shown in Figure 5. Note that the relation between equilibria (A) and (B) is independent
of what type of preferences the player have. All possible types of preferences discussed
above yields the same result.
As shown in Figure 5 the corporatist economy always exhibits a lower wage rate than
the non-corporatist economy. Furthermore, Katzenstein (1985) argues that the coordi-
nation of conﬂicting objectives between interest groups and the government is strongest





























Figure 5: Diﬀerent equilibria: non-corporatist (A), corporatist (B), and corporatist co-
operative equilibrium (C).
also observed by Lehmbruch (1982). Hence there are two types of equilibria in corporatist
economies, not only the Nash-Cournot equilibrium (B) but also a cooperative equilibrium
(C) s o m e w h e r eo nt h ec o n t r a c tc u r v e( t h ed o t t e dl i n ei nF i g u r e5 ) .T ok e e pt h ea n a l y s i s
as simple as possible we focus on a situation where the economy is in stress, i.e. we
assume that the level of aggregated production have not changed, which otherwise would
give shifts in all curves in the ﬁgure. Note however that this would not change the results
from the analysis, it would only complicate the ﬁgures.
If the corporatist economy is under stress, then by assumption, the union and the
government starts to cooperate. As illustrated in Figure 5 the results from cooperation
between the corporatist union and the government is however ambiguous. Yet welfare
improving for the parties involved the evolution of wages and unemployment beneﬁt
levels are depending on the location of the bliss points and the slope of the government
reaction function. Note the possibility that in the cooperative equilibrium wages can be
even higher than in the non-corporatist economy. Hence, ceteris paribus the corporatist
economy can show higher unemployment rates and lower production rates compared to
the non-corporatist economy. Thus the results from the analysis can be stated as:
In a stable economic environment an economy with a corporatist social organisation
15compared to a non-corporatist economy yields lower wage rates and hence lower
unemployment rates and higher levels of aggregated production, ceteris paribus.
In a more volatile economic environment, where the domestic economy is in stress,
the result of a corporatist social organisation is ambiguous.
5 Concluding Remarks
This study analyses diﬀerences in aggregated production and unemployment in corpo-
ratist respective non-corporatist economies. In the model the corporatist union is deﬁned
as taking broader social interest than the non-corporatist union. Furthermore, in the
corporatist economy the government and the trade union, by assumption based on ar-
guments by political scientists e.g. Lehmbruch (1982) and Katzenstein (1985), have the
possibility of cooperating when the economy is under stress or hit by an exogenous shock.
With long-term wage contracts this structure implies that in a stable economic environ-
ment, on average, a new contract will be settled on the non-cooperative equilibrium. On
the contrary, in a volatile economic environment, cooperation is frequent which implies
that on average a new wage contract will be settled on the cooperative equilibrium wage
rate.
In our model the results of corporatism is highly dependent on the economic environ-
ment. In periods of stability the wages in the corporatist economy tend to be lower com-
pared to non-corporatist economies, with strong trade unions. The level of unemployment
beneﬁts in the corporatist economy relative non-corporatist economies is indeterminate.
If the corporatist economy is in stress, then by assumption, cooperation between the
government and the corporatist trade union appears. The cooperation turns out to be
welfare improving for the parties involved but yield ambiguous results on unemployment
beneﬁts, wages and hence unemployment rates and the level of aggregated production.
This model extends the conclusions in Burda (1997) to be valid only in periods of
volatility in the economic environment. Burda modelled corporatism as cooperation
between the government and the union. This is welfare improving for the parties involved,
but has few implications for the evolution of unemployment beneﬁts, wages, and hence
for the unemployment level. Furthermore, the result from our model of persistently lower
wages in the corporatist economy under periods of stability in the economic environment,
supports the hypothesis by Calmfors and Driﬃll (1988) of a hump shaped relationship
between real wages and the degree of wage centralisation, where high degrees of wage
16centralisation is characterised as corporatism. However, this need not be the case in
periods of volatility in the economic environment.
T h er e s u l t so ft h em o d e lc a ne x p l a i nt h ep o o re c o n o m i cp e r f o r m a n c ei ns o m eo ft h e
former successful corporatist states. One central feature in corporatism is the centralised
wage bargaining, and also the existence of social contracts. As a rule these contracts run
over several years. Thus, in order to be successful an economy with long-term contracts
requires stability. The economic environment during the 1950s up to the beginning of the
1970s can be characterised as fairly stable. The demand side were stable or increasing
a n dp r o d u c t i o nw e r eg r o w i n g .T h eﬁnancial markets were still regulated, preventing large
capital ﬂows between diﬀerent states.
The problems in the corporatist states started in the 1970s with a combination of the
oil crisis and the collapse of the exchange rate system as well as a stagnation or decline
on the demand side and increased competition in important industries from e.g. newly
industrialised countries, which accelerated in the 1980s. Add to this the technological
development and use of information technology, and the deregulation of the ﬁnancial
markets around 1990. The increased interdependency between states together with the
deregulations of important ﬁnancial markets gives that the autonomous economy does
not exist on national level any more. Then the international economic environment for
the European corporatist states has completely changed. Thus this could be one reason
why the corporatist states have problems because contracts on the national level do not
have the same importance as earlier. It can even be that the corporatist structure is a
problem in the domestic economy, because special interest groups are given strong power.
This is argued in e.g. Jacobsson et al. (1999). Hence corporatism seems not a successful
way to organise society in the globalised economy of today.
Studies in political science, e.g. Lewin (1992) have concluded that the corporatist
structures have been fading out since the beginning of the 1980s. This might be explained
by Stigler’s (1971) capture theory. Stigler (1971) argues that corporatism undermines
the position of organisations. The organisation’s representatives in public authorities
could easily be captured by the authority itself and become its’ spokesman instead of
supervisor undermining the core idea of corporatism. However, the results of the present
model could serve as an alternative, or complementary, explanation to the phenomenon
of declining corporatism. If the period from the 1980s can be characterised of instability
compared to the period from the 1950s till the end of the 1970s then the decline of
corporatism coincides with a period where there is cooperation in the corporatist states.
As has been shown above this cooperation is welfare improving for the parties involved
17but can yield results not optimal for the economy as a whole. Hence, the situation is
not sustainable. The reason is that in the new economic environment the special interest
group seems to get disproportionate large power. In such cases the interest group seems
to beneﬁt on the cost of others in the economy and it is very hard for a trade union to
be intimately connected with the government when the unemployment rate is increasing
but wages for the employed at the same time increases.
The industry does not have an active role in the game in this model. Intuitively, allow-
ing the owners of the ﬁr m st ou s eap a r to ft h ep r o ﬁts for lobbying the government for a
higher weight δ on the level of production in the government’s objective function (5) this
would shift the government preference map to the left in Figure 3. Consequently the gov-
ernment reaction function will be shifted to the left; thus implying lower unemployment
beneﬁt levels, reducing taxes and thus increasing employment. However, allowing for
this would not have any implications on the results of the analysis of diﬀerences between
corporatist and non-corporatist economies. The ambiguous results from cooperation in
the corporatist economy would persist.
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